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Abstract 
This paper estimates peer effects in a university context where students are randomly assigned to 
sections. While students benefit from better peers on average, low-achieving students are harmed 
by high-achieving peers. Analyzing students’ course evaluations suggests that peer effects are 
driven by improved group interaction rather than adjustments in teachers’ behavior or students’ 
effort. We further show, building on Angrist (2014), that classical measurement error in a setting 
where group assignment is systematic can lead to substantial overestimation of peer effects. With 
random assignment, as is the case in our setting, estimates are only attenuated. 
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1 Introduction 
The promise of the peer effects literature is to provide policy makers with advice that can be used 
to increase overall performance by simply reorganizing peer groups. When looking at the by now 
substantial number of published articles that estimate peer effects in education, it becomes apparent 
that the literature has not yet delivered this promise. This can be seen, for example, in the recent 
review by Sacerdote (2011), who shows that size and even the sign of peer effects estimates notably 
differ between and even within primary, secondary and post-secondary education. 
One potential reason why peer effects estimates are so varied is that there are a number of 
social and statistical forces that lead to similar outcomes between peers, even in the absence of 
causal peer effects (Angrist, 2014; Manski, 1993). Two well-known challenges to the identification 
of peer effects are the selection and reflection problem. The selection problem states that peer 
groups are usually formed endogenously and that it is empirically difficult to distinguish peer 
effects from selection effects. The reflection problem states that it is impossible to distinguish the 
effect of peers on the individual from the effect of the individual on peers if both are determined 
simultaneously. A number of recent peer effects studies (Carrell, Fullerton, & West, 2009; Carrell, 
Sacerdote, & West, 2013; Duflo, Dupas, & Kremera, 2011; Lyle, 2007) have convincingly 
addressed the selection and reflection problems by studying peer effects in a setting where students 
are exogenously assigned to peer groups and by using pre-treatment characteristics as measures for 
peer ability. Even these estimates, however, might be biased due to a mechanical relationship 
between the measures of own and peer ability as described in Angrist (2014). The nature of this 
bias is still poorly understood. 
In the analytical part of this paper, we build on Angrist (2014) to analyze the role of 
measurement error in the estimation of peer effects. We show that classical measurement error —
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which is usually associated with attenuation bias — can lead to overestimation of peer effects. We 
find that the size and direction of this bias depends on the true underlying peer effect and the group 
assignment mechanism. We show, both analytically and using Monte Carlo simulations, that in 
settings where peers are randomly assigned, classical measurement error will only lead to 
attenuation bias. With systematic student assignment, however, measurement error can lead to 
substantial overestimation of peer effects. This bias is distinct from selection bias. 
Besides estimation bias, the large heterogeneity in peer effect estimates might reflect that 
peer effects are generated by mechanisms that are highly context specific. Take, for example, 
adjustment of teachers’ behavior as one potential channel of peer effects. While Duflo et al. (2011) 
have shown that this channel matters in Kenyan classrooms, it is irrelevant in the settings where 
peer groups have no common teachers like in living communities (Carrell et al., 2009; Carrell et 
al., 2013; Lyle, 2007; Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman, 2003). A better understanding of the channels 
that drive peer effects could lead to a better understanding about why they differ across contexts. 
So far, there exists only limited empirical evidence on the channels of peer effects.1 
In the empirical part of this paper we estimate peer effects in academic achievement in a 
setting where peers are randomly assigned to sections at the university level. The data consists of 
all students enrolled at the School of Business and Economics (SBE) at Maastricht University and 
their grades over a period of three years, which amounts to 7,672 students and 39,813 grades. 
Course participants are assigned to sections, groups of 10 to 15 students, which spend most of their 
contact hours together in one classroom. Our measure of student performance is course grades. 
Following the standard approach in the literature, to avoid the reflection problem, we use a pre-
                                                   1 See, for example, Duflo et al. (2011) for evidence on channels in primary education, Lavy, Paserman and Schlosser  (2012) in secondary education and Booij, Leuven and Osterbeek (2015) in post-secondary education.  
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treatment indicator of peer quality: the past GPA of the peers. To identify potential non-linearities 
in peer effects, we estimate heterogeneous effects in terms of student and peer achievements. 
Finally, we use data on students’ individual level course evaluation to shed some light on which 
channels might be driving the observed peer effects in our setting. 
Our results for the linear-in-means specification show that being assigned to a section with, 
on average, higher-achieving peers increases students’ grades in that course by a statistically 
significant but small amount. A one standard deviation increase in the average peer GPA causes an 
increase of 1.26 percent of a standard deviation in student grades. This result, however, masks 
important heterogeneity: low-achieving students are actually harmed by high-achieving peers. 
Analyzing students’ course evaluations, we find suggestive evidence that the main channel of the 
observed peer effects is improved group interaction. We find no evidence for an adjustment in 
teachers’ behavior or student effort driven by the section peer composition.  
Taken together this article makes three main contributions. First, our discussion of the role 
of measurement error in the estimation of peer effects sheds light on a potential threat to the 
identification of peer effects that has so far been poorly understood. Second, we provide clean 
estimates of peer effects using a large dataset of randomly assigned students. Third, we are among 
the first to provide evidence of the underlying channels of peer effects using students’ course 
evaluations. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the existing 
literature. Section 3 builds on Angrist (2014) to analyze how measurement error biases the 
estimation of peer effects. Section 4 describes the institutional environment studied and the 
assignment procedure of students into sections. Section 5 discusses the dataset. Section 6 provides 
evidence that the assignment to sections is random, conditional on scheduling constraints. Section 
 - 4 -   
7 discusses the empirical strategy and the results. Section 8 investigates underlying channels using 
students’ course evaluations. Section 9 concludes. 
 
2   Literature Review 
The size and nature of peer effects estimates across the vast literature are quite varied and appear 
highly context specific. In his review, Sacerdote (2011) shows that peer effects estimates at the 
mean vary from a decrease of 0.12 points (Vigdor & Nechyba, 2007) to an increase of 6.8 points 
(C. Hoxby, 2000) for a 1.0 point increase in the average test score of the peers in primary and 
secondary education.2 Estimates of non-linear effects in these studies also differ substantially. 
While there is some evidence of high achieving students benefiting from high achieving peers, 
overall there is no reliable pattern across studies (see Sacerdote (2011) and studies cited within). 
In the context of post-secondary education, a number of studies address the selection 
problem by exploiting exogenous assignment of students to sections (Booij et al., 2015; De Giorgi, 
Pellizzari, & Woolston, 2012), dorm rooms (e.g., Brunello, De Paola, & Scoppa, 2010; Sacerdote, 
2001; Zimmerman, 2003) and living communities in military colleges (Carrell et al., 2009; Carrell 
et al., 2013; Lyle, 2007). Linear-in-mean point estimates in these environments are typically small 
and positive or statistically insignificant. 
The inconsistencies of the peer effects literature have been attributed to endogeneity in peer 
group formation (Brock & Durlauf, 2001; Lin, 2010) and estimation bias (Angrist, 2014). We think 
that there are at least two other reasons why we might expect results to differ between studies: First, 
peer effects estimates are often presented in terms of standard deviations in a given sample, and 
                                                   2 See also Epple and Romano (2011) and Sacerdote (2014) for recent reviews.  
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estimates of non-linear effects usually rely on dividing students into achievement quantiles 
(Sacerdote, 2014). These results are not comparable across studies because reported peer effect 
estimates might actually reflect differences in achievement distributions rather than differences in 
peer effects. Second, peer effects can run through a number of potential channels which are likely 
to generate different peer effects depending on the contexts in which they are studied. While peer 
effects in primary and secondary education might partly run through classroom disruptions (Figlio, 
2007; Lazear, 2001), these channels might be less pronounced in post-secondary education. 
Moreover, teachers’ adjustments of pedagogical practice to the classroom composition might be 
an important channel for classroom settings (Duflo et al., 2011; Lavy et al., 2012), but this channel 
will not matter when studying peer effects in roommate settings. For living communities where 
peers spend a great deal of time together, we would expect student effort, i.e., adjustments in (joint) 
study hours, to be an important channel (Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner, 2006).  
 
3  Measurement Error and the Estimation of Peer Effects 
In a recent overview, Angrist (2014) discusses many threats to the identification of peer effects. In 
particular, he shows, building on earlier work by Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), that measurement 
error can lead to overestimation of peer effects.3 This might seem counterintuitive since 
measurement error is usually associated with attenuation bias. The key problem in this context is 
that measurement error in own ability will automatically lead to measurement error in measured 
group ability because it is an aggregate of the individual ability measures. Since ability will always 
be measured with some error, a typical peer effects regression will thus contain two mismeasured 
                                                   3 See also Moffitt (2001) and Ammermueller and Pischke (2009) for a discussion on the role of measurement error in the estimation of peer effects. 
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independent variables, which makes the direction of the bias unclear. We phrase the discussion 
below in terms of the estimation of peer effects, but it generalizes to other settings where one 
independent variable is the group average of another mismeasured independent variable.4 In these 
settings measurement error can lead to an upward bias in the group average coefficient.  
We believe Angrist has uncovered an important source of bias that deserves further 
investigation since he does not explicitly show under which assignment mechanisms an upward 
bias exists or how the magnitude of this bias depends on the underlying parameters. In this section 
we will therefore first review Angrist’s decomposition of the peer effects coefficient. Then, 
expanding upon this, we will show how classical measurement error can lead to overestimation of 
peer effects. Finally, we use Monte Carlo simulations to show how the size of this bias varies under 
different peer assignment regimes. 
 
3.1 Decomposition of the Peer Effects Estimator 
Consider the following OLS regression model 
ݕ௜௚ = ߤ + ߨ଴ݔ௜ +  ߨଵ̅ݔ௚ + ߦ௜,      (1) 
where ݕ௜௚ is the grade of student ݅ in group ݃, ݔ௜ is the measure of student ability, ̅ݔ௚ is the average 
of ݔ௜ in group ݃, ߦ௜ is an error term and ܧሾߦ௜  |ݔ௜ሿ =  ܧൣߦ௜  ห̅ݔ௚൧ = 0. For simplicity we will discuss 
group average measures of ability as opposed to the leave-out means (i.e., the group average 
excluding student i) as this distinction matters little econometrically. In particular, Angrist (2014) 
                                                   4 The problem we describe here for the estimation of peer effects also arises in other contexts, for example, when 
including both own household income and the average household income in a geographic area in the same regression. Whenever “own status” and some group average of this status are included in the same regression measurement error can lead to upward bias in the estimated group coefficient. 
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has shown that the peer effects estimator, when using leave-out means instead of group averages, 
differs only by a factor of  ே೒ே೒ିଵ, where ௚ܰ is the size of group g. Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) 
have shown that in this setup the population parameter ߨଵ is equal to   
ߨଵ = ߶(߰ூ௏ − ߰ை௅ௌ) ≈  ߰ܫܸ − ܱ߰ܮܵ,      (2) 
where ߰ை௅ௌ is equal to the population coefficient from a bivariate regression of ݕ௜௚ on ݔ௜ , and ߰ூ௏ 
is the population coefficient of ability in a two-stage least squares IV regression of ݕ௜௚ on ability 
using group dummies as instruments for ability. ߶ = ଵଵିோమ, where ܴଶ is the R-squared from the first 
stage of the above IV regression.5 As this R-squared is typically close to zero, the peer effects 
estimator is approximately equal to the difference between the IV and OLS estimator of grades on 
own ability. 
One can see from Equation (2) that not only peer effects, but all factors that lead to a 
difference between ߰ூ௏ and ߰ை௅ௌ will affect ߨଵ. We will focus here on measurement error in ݔ௜ as 
a plausible reason why ߰ூ௏ and ߰ை௅ௌ would differ even in the absence of peer effects.6 But how 
can measurement error lead to an overestimation of peer effects? The intuition behind this is as 
follows: If there is measurement error in ݔ௜, both ߰ூ௏ and ߰ை௅ௌ are attenuated. When student 
assignment to peer groups is systematic, ߰ ூ௏ is, in the absence of actual peer effects, less attenuated 
than ߰ை௅ௌ, which leads to an overestimation of peer effects. While Angrist also argues that the 
direction of the bias depends on the assignment mechanism, he is—probably due to the condensed 
                                                   5 Definitions of ߰ை௅ௌ, ߰ூ௏and ܴଶ can be found in Appendix A1.1. 6 Angrist further mentions weak instrument bias: If students are randomly assigned to groups an IV with a weak first 
stage might bias ߰ூ௏ towards ߰ை௅ௌ  which would bias peer effects estimates towards zero. 
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nature of his overview—not explicit on why this is the case. We show this bias analytically in the 
next section. 
 
3.2 Measurement Error and Bias of ࣊૚ 
We model the grade data generating process as follows:  
ݕ௜௚ = ߜ + ߚ଴ݔ௜∗ + ߚଵ̅ݔ௚∗ + ݑ௜,      (3) 
where ݕ௜௚ is the grade of student i in group g, ݔ௜∗ is student i’s latent ability, ݔ௚∗ is the group average 
of ݔ௜∗ in group ݃, ߜ is a constant, ߚ଴ is the causal effect of ability on grade and the parameter of 
interest, ߚଵ, is the causal effect of group average ability on grade. We, however, only observe a 
noisy measure of individual ability, ݔ௜ = ݔ௜∗ + ߝ௜, where ߝ௜ is classical measurement error, which 
has a mean of zero and is independent of ݔ௜∗, ̅ݔ௚∗ and ݑ௜. Measurement error in the measure of 
individual ability will automatically lead to measurement error in the measure of group ability so 
that ̅ݔ௚ = ̅ݔ௚∗ + ߝ௚̅, where ̅ݔ௚∗ and  ߝ௚̅ are the respective averages of  ݔ௜∗ and ߝ௜ in group g. To focus 
this discussion on the role of measurement error, we assume that ܧሾݑ௜  |ݔ௜∗ሿ =  ܧൣݑ௜ ห̅ݔ௚∗൧ = 0, 
which means that if we would perfectly observe ݔ௜∗ and ̅ݔ௚∗ (i.e., if ߝ௜ = 0), ߨଵ would be equal to 
ߚଵ.7 We take Equation (2) as a starting point and further decompose the peer effects estimator given 
the definition of variables and data generating process defined above. For brevity, we do the 
analytical step-by-step decomposition in Appendix A1.1, where we show that: 
ߨଵ = ߚଵ߶(௏௔௥൫௫̅೒∗ ൯௏௔௥൫௫̅೒൯ − ௏௔௥൫௫̅೒
∗ ൯
௏௔௥(௫೔) ) + ߚ଴߶(௏௔௥൫௫̅೒
∗ ൯
௏௔௥൫௫̅೒൯ − ௏௔௥൫௫೔
∗൯
௏௔௥(௫೔)).   (4) 
                                                   7 Note that throughout this paper we understand ability very broadly as all stable factors that influence grades, including innate ability, motivation, and access to academic resources. 
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Note that ߶, which is equal to ଵଵିோమ, is always larger than one and usually close to one. We define 
W ≡ ௏௔௥൫௫̅೒∗ ൯௏௔௥൫௫̅೒൯ − ௏௔௥൫௫̅೒
∗ ൯
௏௔௥(௫೔)  and Q ≡ ௏௔௥൫௫̅೒
∗ ൯
௏௔௥൫௫̅೒൯ − ௏௔௥൫௫೔
∗൯
௏௔௥(௫೔) and can thus rewrite Equation (4) like this:  
 ߨଵ = ߚଵ߶ܹ + ߚ଴߶ܳ.        (5) 
We show in Appendix A1.2 that without measurement error ߨଵ is equal to ߚଵ. We further 
show that ߶W will always range between 0 and 1, and in the case of random assignment to peer 
groups, it will be equal to the test reliability of ability ௏௔௥൫௫೔∗൯௏௔௥(௫೔). So ߶W alone would only lead to an 
attenuation of ߨଵ. To understand any potential upward bias of ߨଵ, we need to understand the 
relationship between the ratio of variances of latent to measured group average ability ௏௔௥൫௫̅೒∗ ൯௏௔௥൫௫̅೒൯  and 
the ratio of variances of latent to measured individual ability ௏௔௥൫௫೔∗൯௏௔௥(௫೔) in ܳ. When all individual 
ability measures have the same variance, we can rewrite ܳ as (see Appendix A1.2): 
 ܳ = ௏௔௥൫௫೔∗൯௏௔௥൫௫೔∗൯ା ೇೌೝ(ഄ೔)(భశ ൫ಿ೒షభ൯ഐ) −
௏௔௥൫௫೔∗൯௏௔௥൫௫೔∗൯ା௏௔௥(ఌ೔) ,    (6) 
where ߩ is the average correlation of the distinct student abilities in group g,8 and ܸܽݎ(ߝ௜) is the 
variance of the measurement error. 
Understanding the role of ߩ is central in understanding a potential upward bias in ߨଵ. 
Importantly, when students are randomly assigned, ߩ will be zero and the first and second term of 
Equation (6) will be equal in size. This means that Q will be zero and ߨଵ will only be attenuated. 
When students of similar ability tend to be grouped together, ߩ will be positive, and the first term 
                                                   
8 More specifically, ρ = ଵܰ݃൫ܰ݃ିଵ൯ ∑
஼௢௩(ݔ∗݅,ݔ∗݆)
௏௔௥(ݔ∗݅)
ܰ݃௜ஷ௝ . 
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of Equation (6) will be larger than the second one; hence, Q will be positive. In this case—assuming 
that the effect of own ability on grade ߚ଴ is positive—ߨଵwill be upward biased in the absence of 
peer effects. Given that ߩ is positive, the bias will increase with the group size ௚ܰ. Note that a 
positive ߩ can also be driven by non-random grouping at a higher level. In our setting, for example, 
students’ course selection is non-random, while assignment to sections within courses is random. 
Fortunately, including course fixed effects eliminates this problem by taking out the correlation of 
individual abilities, which is driven by systematic assignment of students to courses.9  
Figure (1) visualizes our analytical findings by describing the bias as a function of the true peer 
effects for different values of ߩ. To get an idea about the potential size of the bias we use plausible 
values for the variables and parameters in Equation (4). In particular, we set ܸܽݎ(ݔ௜∗) = 1 and 
ܸܽݎ(ߝ௜) = 1/9 to get a high test reliability of 0.9, which is approximately the test reliability of the 
SAT for measured ability (The College Board, 2014). The effect of own ability on grade ߚ଴ is set 
to 0.6, which is approximately equal to the coefficient of the measure of own ability in our setting. 
We also assume that own ability, peer ability and grade are measured with the same scale so that 
we can compare the magnitude of the bias with typical peer effects estimates from the review of 
Sacerdote (2011). For ߩ = 0, as is the case under random assignment, peer effect estimates are only 
attenuated. For ߩ > 0 peer effects estimates are upward biased in the absence of peer effects, and 
this bias declines as peer effects increase.  
  
                                                   9 When including course fixed effects, Equation (4) holds if we replace ݔ௜  with the residuals of a regression of ݔ௜ on course dummies, ݔ෤௜, throughout. ݔ෤௜ is the ability measure demeaned at the course level (see: Angrist, 2014; Frisch & Waugh, 1933).   
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Figure 1: Bias as a Function of the Actual Peer Effects for Different Values of ૉ 
 Note: This Figure is based on Equation (4), with ߚ଴ = 0.6, ܸܽݎ(̅ݔ௚∗) = 1 and ܸܽݎ(ߝ௜) = 1/9 .  
 
The overall direction of the bias depends on whether the upward bias caused by ߚ଴߶ܳ 
exceeds the attenuation bias caused by ߚଵ߶ܹ (see Equation (5)). The potential magnitude of the 
bias is substantial: In the absence of peer effects, for example, and with a group assignment that 
leads to ߩ = 0.1, OLS estimates would, on average, wrongly suggest that a one point increase in 
peer ability leads to an approximately 0.04 point increase in grade. This bias would be even larger 
for more noisy ability measures: a test reliability of 0.6, for example, would lead to an upward bias 
of approximately 0.12. Differences in measurement error, degree of assortative assignment and 
group size between studies can thus contribute to the large heterogeneity in peer effects estimates 
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through the mechanism described above. For comparison, the linear in means peer effects estimates  
reported in the review by Sacerdote (2011) range from -0.12 to 6.8 with a median of 0.3.10  
 
3.3 Results from Monte Carlo Simulations 
To confirm our analytical results, we estimate Equation (3) using Monte Carlo simulations.11 We 
use the same values for variables and parameters as for Figure 112 and show how results vary by 
the student assignment mechanism. In particular, we simulate an environment with 1,500 students 
who are divided into 10 courses. Each course has 10 sections, and each section has 15 students. To 
see how estimates depend on the true peer effect, we set ߚଵ to 0 and 0.3. We test three different 
assignment mechanisms: 1) Random assignment to courses and sections, 2) Assortative course 
assignment and random section assignment, and 3) Random course assignment and assortative 
section assignment. Assortative assignment here means that students are assigned (or self-select) 
to peers with similar abilities. Under the random assignment, ߩ is approximately 0 and assignment 
mechanisms 2 and 3 lead to a ߩ of approximately 0.1. The assortative assignment of students to 
sections is based on one variable which is correlated with ability. In practice this “assignment 
variable” may or may not be observable to the researcher. 
Table 1 shows the average difference between estimated and actual peer effects—an 
indication of the estimation bias—using OLS estimation with 1,000 Monte Carlo replications. The 
                                                   10 This refers to the peer effects estimates for primary and secondary schools reported in Table 4.2 in Sacerdote (2011). 11 The Stata Do-file of this simulation be downloaded under:  http://ulfzoelitz.com/publications/extra-material 12 This means that ߚ଴ = 0.6, ability ݔ௜∗~ܰ(0,1), measurement error ߝ௜~ܰ(0,1/9) and group ability ̅ݔ௚∗ and its measure ̅ݔ௚  are calculated as laid out above. We set the error term of the model to ݑ௜~ܰ(0,1).     
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first rows of Panels A, B and C show that peer effect estimates are unbiased in the absence of 
measurement error for all assignment mechanisms. This confirms that the bias discussed here is 
not driven by selection bias in the classical sense.  
The second rows of Panels A, B and C show the results with measurement error. All results 
confirm our analytical discussion. Under random assignment to courses and sections, measurement 
error leads to attenuation bias (see Columns (3) and (4) of Panel A). With assortative assignment, 
however, peer effects are overestimated (see Columns (1) and (3) of Panels B and C). The size of 
the bias is as predicted by our analytical results: in the absence of peer effects, for example, and 
with course or section assignment that leads to a ߩ = 0.1, the bias is approximately 0.04 (see 
Column (1) of Panels B and C). As expected, the inclusion of course fixed effects eliminates the 
upward bias caused by assortative assignment to courses, and peer effects estimates are then only 
attenuated (see Column (4) of Panel B).  
In many practically relevant settings, non-random assignment to sections (i.e., the peer 
group of interest) is likely to lead to a positive ߩ. In the (rare) case where this assortative assignment 
is based on an observable assignment variable, controlling for this variable eliminates the potential 
upward bias. Estimates will then again only be attenuated (see Column (4) of Panel C). This applies, 
for example, when students are tracked within schools based on past performance observable to 
the researcher. In this case controlling for students’ past performance will eliminate the potential 
upward bias by the mechanism described above.  
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Table 1: Simulation Results on Bias in Peer Effects Estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         Actual peer effect = 0.00  Actual peer effect = 0.30 
Panel A Random course and section assignment (ρ = 0) 
     
Average estimate – actual peer 
effect (Without measurement error) 
-0.0021 -0.0035 -0.0021 -0.0035 
[-0.0074 ; 0.0056] [-0.0086 ; 0.0049] [-0.0085 ; 0.0042] [-0.0102 ; 0.0032]      Average estimate – actual peer 
effect (With measurement error) 
0.0004 0.0011 -0.0302 -0.0310 
[-0.0066 ; 0.0059] [-0.0077 ; 0.0055] [-0.036 ; -0.0239] [-0.0377 ; -0.0242]      
Course fixed effects NO YES NO YES 
Panel B Assortative course assignment & random section assignment (ρ = .1) 
     
Average estimate – actual peer 
effect (Without measurement error) 
-0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0016 
[-0.0030 ; 0.0061] [-0.0058 ; 0.0091] [-0.0030 ; 0.0061] [-0.0058 ; 0.0091]      
Average estimate – actual peer 
effect (With measurement error) 
0.0401 -0.0017 0.0268 -0.0307 
[0.0356 ; 0.0445] [-0.0054 ; 0.0088] [0.0223 ; 0.0313] [-0.0380 ; -0.0234]      
Course fixed effects NO YES NO YES 
Panel C Random course assignment & assortative section assignment (ρ = .1) 
     
Average estimate – actual peer 
effect (Without measurement error) 
0.0035 0.0038 0.0035 0.0038 
[-0.0090 ; 0.0080] [-0.0060 ; 0.0080] [-0.0090 ; 0.0080] [-0.0060 ; 0.0080]      
Average estimate – actual peer 
effect (With measurement error) 
0.0421 -0.0032 0.0287 -0.0116 
[0.0377 ; 0.0464] [-0.0012 ; 0.0074] [0.0243 ; 0.0332] [-0.0161 ; -0.0071] 
     
Controlling for assignment variable NO YES NO YES 
Note: Monte Carlo simulations based on 1,000 repetitions for each reported estimate. 95% confidence intervals are in brackets [;].  
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Given that ability can only be measured with some degree of error, these findings have 
different implications for studies from non-experimental and (quasi) experimental settings. 
Because in non-experimental settings assortative assignment is likely, measurement error can lead 
to an upward bias on top of any potential selection bias. Studies that use data from (quasi) 
experimental settings, on the contrary, do not have these problems. It has been already well- 
established that random assignment or systematic assignment based observables eliminates 
selection bias. We have now added to this by showing that in these settings measurement error will 
only lead to attenuation bias. In the remainder of this paper, we will present new evidence on the 
structure of peer effects in a setting where students were randomly assigned to university sections. 
 
4 Background 
 4.1 Institutional Environment 
The data we collected for this paper comes from the School of Business and Economics (SBE) of 
Maastricht University, which is located in the south of the Netherlands.13 Currently there are 
approximately 4,200 students at the SBE enrolled in bachelor’s, master’s, and PhD programs. 
Because of its proximity to Germany, the SBE has a large German student population (53 percent) 
mixed with students of Dutch (33 percent) and other nationalities. Approximately 37 percent of the 
students are females. The academic year at the SBE is divided into four regular teaching periods 
of two months and two skills periods of two weeks. Students usually take two courses at the same 
time in the regular periods and one course in the skills period. We exclude courses in skills periods 
                                                   13 See also Feld, Salamanca and Hamermesh (2015) for a detailed description of the institutional background and examination procedure at the SBE. 
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from our analysis because these are often not graded and we could not always identify the relevant 
peer group.14 
The courses are organized by course coordinators, mostly senior staff, and many of the 
teachers are PhD students and teaching assistants. Each course is divided into sections with a 
maximum of 16 students. These sections are the peer group on which we focus. The course size 
ranges from 1 to 638 students, and there are 1 to 43 sections per course. The sections usually meet 
in two weekly sessions of two hours each. Most courses also have lectures that are followed by all 
students in the course and are usually given by senior staff. 
The SBE differs from other universities with respect to its focus on Problem Based 
Learning.15 The general Problem Based Learning setup is that students generate questions about a 
topic at the end of one session and then try to answer these questions through self-study. In the next 
session, the findings are discussed with other students in the section. In the basic form of PBL, the 
teacher plays only a guiding role, and most of the studying is done by the students independently. 
Courses, however, differ in the extent to which they give guidance and structure to the students, 
depending on the nature of the subject covered, with more difficult subjects usually requiring more 
guidance, and the preference of the course coordinator and teacher. 
Compared to the traditional lecture system, the Problem Based Learning system is arguably 
more group focused because most of the teaching happens in small groups in which group 
discussions are the central part of the learning process. Much of the students’ peer interaction 
                                                   14 In some skills courses, for example, students are scheduled in different sections but end up sitting together in the same room. Furthermore, skills courses have no exam at the end of the skill period, and in many skills course, students do not receive a GPA-relevant grade but only a “pass” or a “fail” grade. 15 See http://www.umpblprep.nl/ for a more detailed explanation of PBL at Maastricht University. 
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happens with members of their section, either in the sessions or while completing homework and 
in study groups. 
 
4.2 Students’ Course Evaluations 
Two weeks before the exam, students are invited by email to evaluate the courses they are currently 
taking in an online questionnaire.16 Students receive up to three email reminders, and the 
questionnaire closes before the day of the exam. Students are assured that their individual answers 
will not be passed on to anyone involved in the course. The teaching staff receives no information 
about the evaluation before they have submitted the final course grades to the examination office.17 
This “double blind” procedure is implemented to avoid a situation where either of the two parties 
retaliates with negative feedback in the form of lower grades or evaluations. The exact length and 
content of the online questionnaires differ by course. The questionnaire typically contains 19-25 
closed questions and two open questions. For our analysis, we use the nine core questions that are 
assessed in most courses that allow us to investigate the effect of peers on group functioning, 
student effort and teacher functioning. These questions ask students about how they perceived the 
instructor, how many hours they studied for the course, and about the interaction with their fellow 
students. Data on students’ course evaluations at the individual level were provided by the 
Department of Educational Research and Development of the SBE. The course evaluation data are 
described in greater detail in Section 8. 
 
                                                   16 For more information, see the course evaluation home page: http://iwio-sbe.maastrichtuniversity.nl/default.asp. 17 After exam grades are published, teaching staff receive the results of the courses evaluations aggregated at the section level. 
 - 18 -   
 
4.3 Assignment of Students to Sections 
The Scheduling Department of the SBE assigns students to sections, teachers to sections, and 
sections to time slots. Before each period, there is a time frame in which students can register online 
for the courses they want to take. After the registration deadline, the scheduler is given a list of 
registered students and allocates the students to sections using a computer program. About ten 
percent of the slots in each group are initially left empty and are filled with students who register 
late.18 This procedure balances the amount of late registration students over the sections. Before 
the start of the academic year 2010/11, the section assignment for master’s courses and for 
bachelor’s courses was conducted with the program Syllabus Plus Enterprise Timetable using the 
allocation option “allocate randomly” (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). Since the academic year 
2010/11, all bachelor’s sections have been stratified by nationality with the computer program 
SPASSAT.19 Some bachelor’s courses are also stratified by exchange student status. After the 
assignment of students to sections, the sections are assigned to time slots, and the program Syllabus 
Plus Enterprise Timetable indicates scheduling conflicts.20 Scheduling conflicts arise for 
approximately 5 percent of the initial assignments. If the computer program indicates a scheduling 
                                                   18 About 5.6 percent of students register late. The number of late registrations in the previous year determines the number of slots that are initially left unfilled by the scheduler. 19 The stratification goes as follows: the scheduler first selects all German students (who are not ordered by any observable characteristic) and then uses the option “Allocate Students set SPREAD,” which assigns an equal number of German students to all classes. Then the scheduler repeats this process with the Dutch students and lastly distributes the students of all other nationalities to the remaining spots. 20 There are four reasons for scheduling conflicts: (1) the student takes another regular course at the same time; (2) the student takes a language course at the same time; (3) the student is also a teaching assistant and needs to teach at the same time; and (4) the student indicated non-availability for evening education. By default, all students are recorded as available for evening sessions. Students can opt out of this default position by indicating this in an online form. Evening sessions are scheduled from 6 p.m. to 8 p.m., and approximately three percent of all sessions in our sample are scheduled for this time slot. 
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conflict, the scheduler manually moves students between different sections until all scheduling 
conflicts are resolved. After all sections have been allocated to time slots, the scheduler assigns 
teachers to the sections.21 The section and teacher assignment is then published. After publication, 
the scheduler receives information on late-registering students and allocates them to the empty 
slots. The schedulers do not know the students nor do they observe their previous grades. 
Only 20-25 students (less than one percent) officially switch sections per period. Switching 
sections is possible only through a student advisor and is allowed only for medical reasons or due 
to a conflict with sports practice for students who are on a list of top athletes.22 Students sometimes 
switch their section unofficially when they have extra appointments. This type of switching is 
usually limited to one session, and students rarely switch sections permanently.23 
There are some exceptions to this general procedure. First, when the number of late 
registering student exceeds the number of empty spots, the scheduler creates a new section that 
mainly consists of late registering students. We excluded eight late registration sections from the 
analysis.24 Second, for some bachelor’s courses, there are special sections consisting mainly of 
repeating students. Whether a repeater section is created depends on the preference of the course 
coordinator and the number of repeat students. We excluded 34 repeater sections from the analysis. 
Third, in some bachelor’s courses students who are part of the Maastricht Research Based Learning 
                                                   21 Approximately ten percent of teachers indicate time slots when they are not available for teaching. They do so before they are scheduled, and the signature of the department chair is required. 22 We do not have a record for these students and therefore cannot exclude them. However, section switching in these rare cases is mostly due to conflicts with medical and sports schedules and therefore unrelated to section peers. 23 It is difficult to obtain reliable numbers on unofficial switching. From our own experience and consultation with teaching staff, we estimate that session switching happens in less than 1 percent of the sessions, and permanent unofficial class switching happens for less than 1 percent of the students. 24 Students who register late, for example, generally have a lower GPA and might be particularly busy or stressed during the period in which they registered late, which may also affect their performance. This dynamic might create a spurious relationship between GPA and grades.  
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(MARBLE) program are assigned to separate sections where they often are assigned to more 
experienced teacher. Students of this program are typically the highest performing students of their 
cohort. We excluded 15 sections that consist of MARBLE students from the analysis.25 Fourth, in 
six courses, the course coordinator or other education staff influenced the section composition.26 
We excluded these courses from our analysis. Fifth, some master’s tracks have part-time students. 
Part-time students are scheduled mostly in evening classes, and there are special sections with only 
part-time students. We excluded 95 part-time students from the analysis. Sixth, we excluded the 
first-year-first-period courses of the two largest bachelor’s programs (International Business and 
Economics) because in these courses only particular students, such as repeating student, have 
previous grades. Seventh, we excluded sections for which fewer than five students had a past GPA. 
For these courses, peer GPA does not reliably capture the peer quality of the students in the section. 
Eighth, we excluded sections with more than 16 students (two percent) because the official class 
size limit according to scheduling guidelines is 15, and in special cases 16. Sections with more than 
16 students are a result of room availability constraints or special requests from course 
coordinators. We also excluded 36 courses from the estimation sample in which part of the final 
grade might have consisted of group graded components, such as joint papers or other jointly 
graded projects. After removing these exceptions, neither students nor teachers, and not even 
course coordinators, should have any influence the composition of the sections in our estimation 
sample.  
                                                   25 We identified pure late registration classes, repeater classes and MARBLE classes from the data. The scheduler confirmed the classes that we identified as repeater classes. The algorithm by which we identified late registration classes and MARBLE classes is available upon request.  26 The schedulers informed us about these courses.   
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5  Data 
We obtained data for all students taking courses at the SBE during the academic years 2009/2010, 
2010/2011 and 2011/2012. Scheduling data were provided by the Scheduling Department of the 
SBE. The scheduling data include information on section assignment, the allocated teaching staff 
and the day and time the sessions took place, as well as a list of late registrations for our sample 
period. In total, we have 7,672 students, 395 courses, 3,703 sections and 39,813 grades in our 
estimation sample. Panel A of Table 2 provides an overview of courses, sections and students in 
the different years.27 
The data on student grades and student background, such as gender, age and nationality, 
were provided by the Examinations Office of the SBE. The Dutch grading scale ranges from 1 to 
10, with 5.5 being the lowest passing grade.  
 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A 
 
Academic year Number of courses Number of unique students Number of sections Average number of students per section Number of grades 
2009 / 10 110 3,819 1,134 13.21 11,925 2010 / 11 141 4,018 1,346 13.08 13,768 2011 / 12 144 4,131 1,223 14.18 14,120 All years 395 7,672 3,703 13.50 39,813    
                                                   27 We refer to each course-year combination as a separate course, which means that we treat a course with the same 
course code that takes place in three years as three distinct courses. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
 Panel B 
  Mean S.D. Min 25p Median 75p Max Obs. 
Student level information           Course dropout 0.0841 0.278 0 0 0 0 1 43,471   Grade first attempt 6.537 1.886 1 6 7 8 10 39,813   Final grade 6.745 1.687 1 6 7 8 10 40,601   GPA 6.790 1.206 1 6.122 6.983 7.583 10 43,471          Section level information           Number of registered students per section 13.50 1.317 5 13 14 14 16 43,471   Number of students that dropped class 2.291 1.977 0 1 2 3 14 43,471   Peer GPA 6.757 0.471 4.897 6.441 6.776 7.096 8.500 43,471   Within section SD of peer GPA 1.126 0.365 0.104 0.869 1.105 1.360 2.799 43,471                   Student Background information           Age 20.74 2.203 16.19 19.17 20.42 21.98 41.25 40,469   Female 0.369 0.483 0 0 0 1 1 40,469   Dutch 0.312 0.463 0 0 0 1 1 43,471   German 0.496 0.500 0 0 0 1 1 43,471   Bachelor student 0.793 0.406 0 1 1 1 1 43,471   BA International Business 0.403 0.491 0 0 0 1 1 43,471   BA Economics 0.280 0.449 0 0 0 1 1 43,471   Exchange student 0.0619 0.241 0 0 0 0 1 43,471 Note: This table shows the descriptive statistics of the estimation sample.  
Figure 2: Distribution of Grades after the First Examination 
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Figure 2 shows the distribution of final grades in our estimation sample. The final course 
grade is often calculated as the weighted average of multiple graded components, such as the final 
exam grade, participation grade, presentation grade or midterm paper grade.28 The graded 
components and their respective weights differ by course, with most courses giving most of the 
weight to the final exam grade. If the final course grade of a student after taking the final exam is 
lower than 5.5, the student fails the course and has the option of taking a second and third attempt 
at the exam. We observe final grades after each attempt separately. For our analysis, we use only 
the final grade after the first exam attempt as an outcome measure because first- and second-attempt 
grades are not comparable.29 For the construction of the student GPA, we use the final grades after 
the last attempt.30 
 Panel B of Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics for our estimation sample. Our sample 
contains 43,471 student course registrations. Out of these, 3,658 (8 percent) dropped out of the 
course during the course period. We therefore observe 39,813 course grades after the first attempt. 
The average course grade after the first attempt is 6.54. Approximately one fifth of the graded 
students obtain a course grade lower than 5.5 after the first attempt and therefore fail the course. 
The average final course grade (including grades from second and third attempt) is 6.75, and the 
average GPA is 6.79. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the GPAs based on final grades. 
The peer GPA is the section-average GPA excluding the grades of the student of interest. 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of peer ability, measured as the average GPA of all other students 
in the section. 
                                                   28 We excluded 36 courses in which part of the final grade might have consisted of group graded components from the estimation sample (see Section 4.3). 29 The second-attempt exam usually takes place two months after the first exam. 30 We decided to use the GPA calculated from final grades because this is closer to the popular understanding of GPA.  
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Figure 3: Distribution of Student GPA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution Peer GPA 
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6 Test for Random Assignment of Students to Sections 
The scheduling procedure we describe in Section 4.3 shows that section assignment is random. 
Nevertheless, we test whether section assignment has the properties that one would expect under 
random assignment. In the spirit of standard randomization checks in experiments, we test whether 
section dummies jointly predict student pre-treatment characteristics when controlling for 
scheduling and balancing indicators. The pre-treatment characteristics we consider are GPA, age, 
gender, and student ID rank.31 For each course in our sample, we run a regression of pre-treatment 
characteristics on section dummies as well as scheduling and balancing controls, and we F-test for 
joint significance of the section dummies. Thus, for each pre-treatment characteristic, we run 
approximately 400 regressions. Under conditional random assignment, the p-values of the F-tests 
of these regressions should be uniformly distributed with a mean of 0.5 (Murdoch, Tsai, & Adcock, 
2008). Furthermore, if students are randomly assigned to sections within each course, the F-test 
should reject the null hypothesis of no relation between section assignment and students’ pre-
treatment characteristics at the 5 percent, 1 percent and 0.1 percent significance level in close to 5 
percent, 1 percent and 0.1 percent of the cases, respectively.  
The results of these randomization tests confirm that the section assignment is random 
(Section A3 in the Appendix provides a more detailed description on our randomization check). 
The average of the p-values of the F-tests is close to 0.5 (see Table A1 in the Appendix), and the 
p-values are roughly uniformly distributed (see Figure A2 in the Appendix). Table 2 shows in how 
                                                   31 For approximately 9 percent of our sample, mostly exchange students, we do not know the age, gender and nationality. In Maastricht University, ID numbers are increasing in tenure at the university. ID rank is the rank of the ID number. We use ID rank instead of actual ID because the SBE recently added a new digit to the ID numbers, which creates a discrete jump in the series.  
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many cases the F-test actually rejected the null hypothesis at the respective levels. Column (1) 
shows the total number of courses for each pre-treatment characteristics. Column (3) shows that 
the actual rejection rates at the 5 percent level are close to the expected rejection rates under random 
assignment. The F-tests for the regressions with the dependent variables GPA, age and ID rank are 
rejected slightly more often than 5 percent, and the rejection rate for the dependent variable gender 
is slightly less than 5 percent. Columns (5) and (7) show the actual rejection rates at the 1 percent 
and 0.1 percent levels. Additionally, these rejection rates as a whole are close to the expected rates 
under random assignment, with the exception of age, where the rejection rates is only slightly 
higher than we expected. All together, we present strong evidence that section assignment in our 
estimation sample is random, conditional on scheduling and balancing indicators. 
 
Table 3: Randomization Check of Section Assignment 
  (1)   (2) (3)   (4) (5)   (6) (7) 
Dependent variable Total number of courses  Number significant Percent significant  Number significant Percent significant  Number significant Percent significant 
Joint F-test significant:  ...at the 5 percent level  ...at the 1 percent level  ...at the 0.1 percent level 
GPA 395  22 5.57%  5 1.27%  1 0.25% 
Age 392  24 6.12%  11 2.81%  4 1.02% 
Gender 389  18 4.63%  3 0.77%  0 0.00% 
ID rank 395   20 5.06%   8 2.03%   2 0.51%  Note: This table is based on separate OLS regressions with past GPA, age, gender and ID rank as dependent variables. The explanatory variables are a set of section dummies, dummies for the other parallel course taken at the same time, and dummies for day and time of the sessions, German, Dutch, exchange student status and late registration status. Column (1) shows the total number of separate regressions. Columns (2), (4) and (6) show in how many regressions the F-test rejected the null hypothesis at the 5 percent, 1 percent and 0.1 percent level, respectively. Columns (3), (5) and (7) show for what percentage of the regressions the F-test rejected the null hypothesis at the respective levels. Differences in number of courses are due to missing observations for some of the dependent variables.  
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7  Empirical Strategy and Results 
7.1 Empirical Strategy 
We use the following model to estimate the effect of peers on grades:  
ܻ ௜௚௧ =  ߚଵܩܲܣ௜,௧ିଵ + ߚଶ ܩܲܣതതതതതത௚ି௜,௧ିଵ + ߛ′ܼ௜௚௧ + ߝ௜௚௧. (7) 
The dependent variable ௜ܻ௦௧ is the grade of student ݅, in a course-specific section ݃, at time 
ݐ. ܩܲܣ௜,௧ିଵ is the past GPA of student ݅, and ܩܲܣതതതതതത௚ି௜,௧ିଵ is the average past GPA of all the students 
in the section excluding student ݅.  ܼ௜௚௧ is a vector of additional controls, and ߝ௜௚௧ is an error term. 
In all specifications, ܼ௜௚௧ consists of dummies for day of the week and time of the day of the 
sessions, German, Dutch, exchange student status, late registration status, and year-course-period 
fixed effects.32 In other specifications, we also include other-course fixed effects—fixed effects for 
the other course taken at the same time—and teacher fixed effects.33 Note that ܩܲܣ௜ ௧ିଵ and 
ܩܲܣതതതതതത௚ି௜,௧ିଵ might measure own and peer ability with some error. 34 This might bias our peer effects 
estimates through the mechanisms described in Section 3. Since group assignment is random at the 
section level and we include year-course-period fixed effects, this will lead to an attenuation of 
peer effects. Including stratification controls and teacher fixed effects should increase the precision 
but not affect the size of the estimates. Conceptually, including scheduling controls and other-
                                                   32 For some sections, the time and day of the sessions were missing. We include separate dummies for these missing values.  33 Other-course fixed effects are only defined for students who take up to two courses per period. In only 1.5% of the cases, students were scheduled for more than two courses, and these students drop out of our sample when we include other-course fixed effects. Teacher fixed effects are fixed effects of the first teacher assigned to a session. 
34 Further, note that the precision of own and peer achievement estimates increases with tenure when ܩܲܣ௜ ௧ିଵ and ܩܲܣതതതതതത௦ି௜,௧ିଵ are calculated with more past grades. This means that we would expect any bias from measurement error to decrease with students’ tenure. 
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course fixed effects should pick up all leftover non-random variation in section assignment that is 
due to conflicting schedules. To allow for correlations in the outcomes of students within each 
course, we cluster the standard errors at the course-year-period level. We standardized ௜ܻ௚௧, 
ܩܲܣ௜ ௧ିଵ and ܩܲܣതതതതതത௚ି௜,௧ିଵ to have mean of zero and a standard deviation of one over the estimation 
sample to simplify the interpretation of the coefficients. 
 
7.2 Linear-in-means Results 
Before we show estimates of peer effects on grades, we check whether peer GPA is related to 
course dropouts. The course dropout rate is only 8 percent at the SBE. OLS regressions, which we 
omit for brevity, show that neither average peer GPA nor the other peer GPA variables we use 
when estimating heterogeneous effects significantly predict course dropout. We therefore don’t 
worry about selection bias when interpreting peer effects estimates on grades. 
 
Table 4: Baseline Estimates – Linear-in-means 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  Std. Grade Std. Grade Std. Grade Std. Grade 
          Standardized peer GPA 0.0108* 0.0114* 0.0121** 0.0126**  (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) Standardized GPA 0.5606*** 0.5605*** 0.5623*** 0.5622***  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)      Observations 39,813 39,813 39,813 39,813 R-squared 0.432 0.441 0.448 0.457 Course FE YES YES YES YES Staff FE NO YES NO YES Other course FE NO NO YES YES Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the course-year-period level are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the standardized course grade. All specifications include dummies for day of the session, time of the session, German, Dutch, exchange student status and late registration status. Other-course fixed effects refer to the course that students are taking at the same time. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4 shows the results of OLS regressions with the standardized grade as the dependent 
variable. The table shows that being assigned to section peers with a higher GPA causes higher 
course grades. The coefficient of standardized peer GPA is small but statistically significant in all 
models. The inclusion of teacher fixed effects and other-course fixed effects hardly change the 
effect size or its standard errors. The reported estimate in the most complete specification in 
Column (4) shows that being assigned to peers with a one standard deviation higher GPA increases 
the student’s grade by, on average, 1.26 percent of a standard deviation. The results are very similar 
when we define own and peer GPA solely based on first year grades (see Table A2 in the 
Appendix). In terms of the Dutch grading scale, this estimate means that, for example, an increase 
of peer GPA from 6.5 to 7.0 is associated with a grade increase from 6.50 to 6.523, a small and 
economically insignificant effect. It follows from our discussion in Section 3 that measurement 
error leads to attenuation of our estimator, and this attenuation is proportional to the test reliability 
of ability. To get a rough idea of the unattenuated coefficient, we can divide the coefficient by the 
split-half correlation of GPA, 0.72, an estimator of the test reliability.35 This increases the estimate 
to 1.75 percent of a standard deviation. 
To explore heterogeneous effects we extend the baseline analysis by additionally including 
interaction terms of peer GPA with dummies of course type or student gender. Table 5 shows the 
results of this analysis, where we include the baseline results of Table 4 Column (4) in Column (1) 
for comparison. Column (2) shows that peer effects estimates are larger for master’s compared to 
bachelor’s courses, although the difference is not statistically significant. Previous studies have 
                                                   35 In order to calculate the split-half correlation we randomly assigned all past grades of a student into two groups and constructed two GPAs based on these subgroups. The split-half correlation is the correlation of these ability measures.     
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found that peer effects differ between technical and non-technical subjects. While Brunello et. al. 
(2010) and Carrel et al. (2009) find larger peer effects in technical subjects, Arcidiacono, Foster, 
Goodpaster and Kinsler (2012) find larger peer effects in non-technical subjects.36 To test whether 
peer effects in our settings differ by course technicality, we classified a course as “Technical” if at 
least one of the following words appeared in the course description: “math, mathematics, 
mathematical, statistics, statistical, theory focused.” Doing this, we categorized 31 percent of the 
courses as “Technical.” Column (3) shows that peer effects estimates are a little bit smaller in  
 
Table 5: Linear-in-means Estimates with Course Type and Gender Interactions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Std. Grade Std. Grade Std. Grade Std. Grade 
        
Standardized peer GPA 0.0126** 0.0303* 0.0153** 0.0164** 
 (0.006) (0.017) (0.007) (0.007) 
Standardized peer GPA * bachelor course  -0.0207   
  (0.018)   
Standardized peer GPA * Technical course   -0.0077  
   (0.012)  
Standardized peer GPA * Female    -0.0080 
    (0.011) 
Standardized GPA 0.5622*** 0.5622*** 0.5622*** 0.5841*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
Female    0.0401*** 
    (0.012) 
     
Observations 39,813 39,813 39,813 37,210 R-squared 0.457 0.457 0.457 0.475 Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the course-year-period level are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the standardized course grade. All specifications include dummies for day of the session, time of the session, German, Dutch, exchange student status and late registration status, as well as fixed effects for courses, fixed effects for other courses taken at the same time and teacher fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
                                                   36 Brunello et al. (2010) compare peer effects estimates in hard science and social science majors. Carrell et. al. (2009) compare peer effects in math and science with humanities and social science courses. Arcidiacono et al. (2012) compare peer effects in humanities, social sciences, hard sciences and mathematics and find larger effects for humanities and social sciences.   
 - 31 -   
technical courses, but this difference is not statistically significant. Column (4) shows that 
estimated peer effects are somewhat larger for males, but again this difference is not statistically 
significant. 
 
7.3 Heterogeneity by Own and Peer GPA 
The specifications in Tables 4 and 5 are linear-in-mean, which implicitly assumes that all students 
are linearly affected by the mean GPA of their peers. Previous studies, however, have shown that 
peer effects are likely heterogeneous with respect to both student and peer achievement (Burke & 
Sass, 2013; Carrell et al., 2013). We test for these two sources of heterogeneity simultaneously by 
estimating a two-way interaction model similar to those of Carrell et al. (2013) and Burke and Sass 
(2013). To do this, we classify students as high, middle and low GPA based on whether their GPA 
is in the top, middle or bottom third of the course GPA distribution, respectively. We then calculate 
for each section the fraction of peers with high and low GPA and include interactions of students’ 
own type (high, middle and low GPA) with the fraction of high and low GPA peers in the model 
we estimate. The coefficient “High GPA * Fraction of High GPA peers,” for example, can be 
interpreted as showing how high GPA students are affected by increasing the fraction of high GPA 
peers in the section while keeping the fraction of low GPA peers constant. Put differently, the 
coefficient shows how high GPA students are affected if middle GPA peers (the reference group) 
are replaced with high GPA peers. 
Table 6 shows the coefficients of these six interactions. Overall, the estimated effects are 
small in magnitude: for example, the largest coefficient, “Low GPA * Fraction of low-GPA peers,” 
suggests that an increase of 20 percent in low GPA peers, which is equivalent to replacing three 
out of 15 middle GPA peers with low GPA peers, decreases the grade of a low GPA students by 
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2.63 percent of a standard deviation. The results for high and middle GPA students are in line with 
the linear-in-mean model: high and middle GPA students are positively affected by high GPA peers 
and negatively affected by low GPA peers. The results for low GPA students, however, are 
noticeably different. The point estimate suggests that low GPA students are negatively affected by 
high GPA peers. They are also negatively affected by peers from their own GPA group—low GPA 
peers. The effect of increasing the fraction of high GPA peers is significantly different for low GPA 
students compared to high and middle GPA students. To visualize the heterogeneous results, we 
plot the coefficients of the interactions in Table 6 in Figure 5. It shows that although peer effects 
seem to increase linearly with peer GPA for high and middle GPA students, the effect first increases 
and then decreases for low GPA students.  
These estimates are qualitatively different from the pre-treatment findings of Carrell et al. 
(2013),  who exploit random assignment, which suggested that in particular low achieving students 
benefit from high achieving peers. This result, however, was not robust to an intervention in which 
low achieving students were assigned to squadrons with a large fraction of high achieving peers. 
Contrary to the predictions of their pre-treatment findings, but in line with our results, low 
achieving students were actually harmed by this intervention.   
To put these findings into a broader perspective, it is useful to think about which of the 
existing peer effects models are consistent with the patterns we observe in the data. Hoxby and 
Weingarth (2005) review a number of models that differ in the structure of peer effects they 
generate. While it not really possible to point to one single model that explains all of our results,  
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Table 6: Heterogeneous Effects  
  (1)  Std. Grade 
    High GPA * Fraction of high-GPA peers 0.0410  (0.053) High GPA * Fraction of low-GPA peers -0.1047**  (0.049) Middle GPA * Fraction of high-GPA peers 0.0789  (0.052) Middle GPA * Fraction of low-GPA peers -0.0332  (0.052) Low GPA * Fraction of high-GPA peers -0.1449*  (0.076) Low GPA * Fraction of low-GPA peers -0.1315**  (0.066)   Observations 39,813 R-squared 0.461 F fraction of high peers [middle vs low] 5.40** p-value 0.0207 F fraction of high peers [high vs low] 4.38** p-value 0.0370 F fraction of high peers [high vs middle] 0.26 p-value 0.6114 F fraction of low peers [middle vs low] 1.39 p-value 0.2386 F fraction of low peers [high vs low] 0.10 p-value 0.7462 F fraction of low peers [high vs middle] 1.14 p-value 0.2867 Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the course level are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the standardized course grade. Additional controls include standardized GPA, course fixed effects, other-course fixed effects, teacher fixed effects as well dummies for day of the session, time of the session, German, Dutch, exchange student status and late registration status. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.   
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the evidence we present in this paper is largely consistent with the Bad Apple model.37 This model 
predicts that an increase in the proportion of bottom-achieving peers has a disproportionate 
negative effect on student achievement. Consistent with this, Table 6 shows that low GPA peers 
have a disproportionally large negative effect on high and low GPA students. Their effect on middle 
GPA students is also negative but small and not statistically different from zero.  
 
  Figure 5: The Effect of Peer Fractions for Students with High, Middle and Low GPAs 
 
Note: The data points in this figure are taken from Table 5 using the fraction of middle-GPA peers as a reference category. 
                                                   37 The Shining Light model would predict that a few excellent students would have a disproportionate positive effect on all other students. According to the Boutique model, students benefit most from interacting with students of their own type. Our findings that low achievers are harmed by both a higher proportion of low and high GPA peers are inconsistent with the Boutique model and the Shining Light model. 
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8   Channels of Peer Effects 
8.1 Thinking about the Channels of Peer Effects 
The peer effects we estimated in the previous section might be driven by a number of potential 
channels. Equation (7) describes a simplified version of the education production function that 
establishes the role of three channels, which we can test empirically. 
  ܻ ௜௚൫ ݔ௚൯ =  ܩ௜௚൫ ݔ௚ ൯  + ܧ௜௚൫ ݔ௚൯  +  ௚ܶ൫ ݔ௚൯  +  ߱௜௚,  (7) 
௜ܻ௚ is the grade of student i in section g, which is a function of peer ability ݔ௚ that enters through 
three channels: group functioning ܩ௜௚( ݔ௚ ), students’ effort ܧ௜௚( ݔ௚ )  and teacher functioning 
௚ܶ( ݔ௚). ߱௜௚ captures all other omitted factors, including own ability and the effect of other 
channels. 38  
Prior to looking at the results, it is helpful to consider how we would expect these channels 
to matter in our specific setting. As described in more detail in Section 4.1, the Problem Based 
Learning teaching style practiced at the SBE has a large focus on classroom discussion in which 
students are supposed to explain the course content to each other. Since higher achieving students 
are likely more able to contribute in the classroom, we expect peer GPA to have a positive effect 
on group functioning. The expected direction of the effect of peer GPA on student effort and teacher 
functioning is less clear. On the one hand, better peers might induce students to work harder, e.g. 
via peer pressure, higher aspirations or social norms.39 On the other hand, lower performing 
students might be demotivated by much better peers and exert less effort. Regarding the teacher 
                                                   38 For a theoretical model on how different channels might enter peer effects, see Duflo et al. (2011) and Conley Mehta, Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2015). 39 See Mas and Moretti (2009) and Falk and Ichino (2006) for evidence of peer effects on effort provision. Peers expected performance might also provide a reference point which influences students’ effort provision (see Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006 and Abeler, Falk, Goette and Huffman 2011).  
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behavior, we would expect teachers to adjust to the classroom peer composition by altering the 
difficulty level of their instructions. While an instruction level closer to the own ability level might 
be beneficial, larger deviations are likely to be detrimental. Such a mechanism would then imply 
that students benefit from having more peers of similar abilities. 40 
 
8.2 Empirical Evidence on the Channels 
Table 7 shows the wording and answering scales of the items regarding group interaction, self-
study hours and teacher evaluation.41 In our estimation sample, 38 percent of the students start 
filling out the questionnaire. The last column in Table 7 shows that once students started the 
questionnaire, they answered almost all of items. Answering the course evaluation questionnaire is 
selective. We observe, for example, that students with higher GPAs are more likely to take part in 
the evaluation, and our results should be interpreted in light of this finding. We have nevertheless 
chosen to analyze students’ course evaluation for two reasons. First, the survey response is not 
significantly related to peer quality as measured by mean peer GPA or to the peer GPA variables 
used in Section 7.3 (see Table A3 in the Appendix). Second, the student evaluation data gives us a 
unique insight into potential mechanisms in a way that is not available in most other studies. All 
results, however, should be interpreted with caution, and we interpret them as providing suggestive 
evidence. 
For our analysis, we aggregate items in the domains of group functioning (two items) and 
teacher functioning (six items) by first summing all the standardized item answers and then 
                                                   40 It is also possible that both students and teachers compensate for having worse peers by working harder. Such compensation behavior could explain why the peer effects on grades are overall small in magnitude. 41 Standard items on the course evaluation questionnaire also include items about learning material and general course evaluation. For a complete list of all the standard evaluation items and how each item relates to mean peer GPA, see Table A4 in the Appendix.  
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standardizing the sum of these values in each domain so that the aggregated categories have a mean 
of zero and a standard deviation of one. Answers to the question about self-study hours, which we 
use as a measure of student effort, are left in their natural unit. We impute missing values for items 
that students who started filling out the questionnaire did not answer either because the question 
was not in their course specific questionnaire or because they chose not to answer the question.42 
 
 Table 7: Evaluation Item, Answering Scales and Response Rates  
Nr Item Domain Item Wording Answer Scale 
Response Rate Conditional on Participation 
1 Group interaction My tutorial group has functioned well. 1 - 5 94.1% 
2 Group interaction Working in tutorial groups with my fellow-students helped me to better understand the subject matters of this course. 1 - 5 93.5% 
3 Self-study hours How many hours per week on the average (excluding contact hours) did you spend on self-study (presentations, cases, assignments, studying literature, etc)? 0 - 80 92.8% 
4 Teacher functioning Evaluate the overall functioning of your tutor in this course with a grade 1 - 10 93.5% 
5 Teacher functioning The tutor sufficiently mastered the course content. 1 - 5 93.6% 
6 Teacher functioning The tutor stimulated the transfer of what I learned in this course to other contexts. 1 - 5 93.4% 
7 Teacher functioning The tutor encouraged all students to participate in the (tutorial) group discussions. 1 - 5 93.0% 
8 Teacher functioning The tutor was enthusiastic in guiding our group. 1 - 5 93.5% 9 Teacher functioning The tutor initiated evaluation of the group functioning. 1 - 5 91.5% Note: At Maastricht University, the teaching staff member present in the classroom is referred to as “tutor.” Sections are commonly 
called “tutorial groups.”   
 
                                                   42 Conditional on answering at least one of these questions the percentage of missing answers is between 5.9 and 9.2 percent depending on the item (see Table 7). We apply multiple imputations by chained equations (MICE) with 10 cycles. Note that imputing missing values might bias estimates if the missing at random assumption does not hold. We therefore also report ranges of point estimates using bounding methods in Table A5 in the Appendix, where we assume extreme values for missing answers. We also report results without any imputations in Table A6 in the Appendix. Results are very similar across these different models.   
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Panel A of Table 8 shows that the average peer GPA affects the evaluation of the group 
interaction positively. A one standard deviation increase in peer GPA leads to a 0.056 standard 
deviation increase in evaluation of group interaction. When redoing the analysis with each of the 
two items separately, we find that this result is only driven by the first item (see Table A4 in the 
Appendix). This suggests that the students notice the better group functioning but do not perceive 
higher benefits from it—a result that is not surprising given the small magnitude of the estimated 
peer effects on grades. Hours worked and teacher functioning are not significantly affected by peer 
GPA.  
Panel B shows the results using the same specification for identifying peer effect 
heterogeneity as in Section 7. This model allows us to investigate if the effect of peer GPA on 
course evaluations is heterogeneous in terms of student and peer achievement. When comparing 
the different evaluation domains, we see that the peer variables are jointly significant in explaining 
the evaluation of the group interaction and not jointly significant in explaining the evaluation of 
the teacher or the self-study hours. The results for group interaction suggest that in particular the 
presence of high GPA peers matters. The point estimate suggests that a 20 percent increase in high 
GPA peers increases high GPA students’ evaluation of the group interaction by about 0.105 
standard deviations. The estimated effects of increasing high GPA peers are also positive and about 
half the size for medium and low GPA students, although the effect for medium GPA students is 
not quite statistically significant (p-value: 0.128).  
All in all, our results suggest that, in our setting, group interaction is the most important of 
the three discussed channels. Interestingly, the effect of peer quality on group interaction appears 
to be linear. This implies that the inverse u-shaped pattern for low GPA students we found in 
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Section 7 is driven by other unobserved factors. We do not find evidence for adjustment of teacher 
behavior or student effort.  
 
 
Table 8: The Effect of Peer Composition on Student Evaluations  
Panel A    
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Std. Group interaction Self-study hours  Std. Teacher evaluation 
        Standardized peer GPA 0.0561*** 0.0339 0.0017  (0.015) (0.092) (0.013) Standardized GPA -0.0348*** 0.1353 -0.0426***  (0.010) (0.083) (0.009)     Observations 15,441 15,441 15,441 
    
Panel B    
  (2) (1) (3) 
        High GPA * Fraction of high-GPA peers 0.5267*** -0.4390 0.0839  (0.131) (0.858) (0.096) High GPA * Fraction of low-GPA peers -0.1132 -0.8487 -0.0893  (0.121) (0.852) (0.101) Middle GPA * Fraction of high-GPA peers 0.2265 -0.0499 -0.0462  (0.139) (0.992) (0.124) Middle GPA * Fraction of low-GPA peers 0.0202 1.8395* 0.0055  (0.110) (0.962) (0.114) Low GPA * Fraction of high-GPA peers 0.2659** -0.3977 0.0650  (0.119) (0.919) (0.114) Low GPA * Fraction of low-GPA peers 0.0369 -1.6370* -0.0874  (0.120) (0.956) (0.114)     Observations 15,441 15,441 15,441 F joint significance of peer variables 5.60*** 1.34 0.88 Prob > F 0.0000 0.2391 0.5080 Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the course-year-period level are in parentheses. The dependent variables are standardized Group interaction in Column (1), self-study hours in Column (2) and standardized teacher evaluation in Column (3). All specifications include course fixed effects, other-course fixed effects, teacher fixed effects as well dummies for day of the session, time of the session, German, Dutch, exchange student status and late registration status. All regressions reported in Panel B also include standardized GPA. We imputed missing values as explained in Footnote 40.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Our results are consistent with findings of Booij et al. (2015), who study peer effects in 
settings similar to ours, where the peer group is defined at the section level at a Dutch University. 
They also find evidence for peer effects on group functioning and no evidence of peer effects on 
teacher functioning. Lavy et al. (2012) study the effect of the proportion of repeaters on student 
outcomes in secondary schools. Using student surveys they identify changes in teachers’ 
pedagogical practices and increases in violence and classroom disruptions as important channels. 
Duflo et al. (2011) find in the context of Kenyan primary schools that teachers provide more effort, 
as measured by teacher absenteeism, when they are randomly assigned to a class of high compared 
to low achieving students. Taken together, these findings confirm the notion that the channels, 
which depend on the specific contexts, can create very heterogeneous peer effects. 
 
9 Conclusion 
This article adds to the discussion about threats to the identification of peer effects and provides 
empirical evidence of peer effects in higher education. In the analytical part of this paper, we have 
shown that measurement error can lead to substantial overestimation of peer effects in settings 
where peer group assignment is systematic. In settings where peer group assignment is random or 
based on an observable variable, however, measurement error will only lead to attenuation bias. 
These findings are good news for past and future peer effects studies that rely on natural random 
variation or exploit a perfectly observable assignment mechanism. Peer effects estimates obtained 
from studies with non-observable peer group assignment mechanism have to be interpreted with 
particular caution since they are prone to potentially severe upward bias due to measurement error. 
This bias is not the same as, and may occur on top of, any potential selection bias. 
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In the empirical part of this paper, we have estimated peer effects in a sample where 
university students are randomly assigned to sections. Consistent with previous research, we find 
effects of average peer quality on student grades that are small in size but statistically significant. 
These average effects hide important heterogeneity however. While high and middle ability 
students benefit from better peers, low ability students are harmed by their high ability peers. 
Evidence from students’ course evaluations suggests that peer effects are driven mainly by changes 
in group interaction and not by adjustments in teachers’ behavior or students’ effort. 
Our non-linear estimates suggest that it would be possible to achieve small overall gains in 
student performance by reorganizing peer groups. Without knowing the process that generates the 
observed peer effects, however, it is not clear whether this would be welfare enhancing. In 
principle, increased student performance can be a result of an increase in efficiency or an increase 
in students’ or teachers’ effort. An increase in student or teacher effort implies costs which should 
be weighed against the benefits from increased student performance. If, however, as our results 
suggest, the increase in students’ performance is driven by better group interaction, reorganization 
of peer groups can lead to higher efficiency, and welfare gains could therefore be possible. 
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APPENDIX 
A1 Classical Measurement Error and the Estimation of Peer Effects 
A1.1  Decomposing ߨଵ 
We rewrite Equation (2) as 
ߨଵ = ట಺ೇିటೀಽೄଵିோమ           (A1) 
and take this as starting point to further decompose the peer effects estimator based on the data 
generating process and variables defined in Section 3. ߰ூ௏ is a two-stage least square IV estimator. 
The first stage of this IV regression uses group dummies as instruments for ݔ௜, and the predicted 
values of this first stage are thus group averages of ݔ௜.  ߰ூ௏ is therefore equal to the coefficient 
from a bivariate regression of ݕ௜௚ on ̅ݔ௚: 
߰ூ௏ = ஼௢௩(௫̅೒,௬೔೒)௏௔௥(௫̅೒)  .         (A2) 
By substituting ݕ௜௚ with Equation (3) and rearranging, we get:43 
߰ூ௏ = ஼௢௩൫௫̅೒,(ఋାఉబ௫೔∗ା ఉభ௫̅೒∗ ା ௨೔)൯௏௔௥(௫̅೒)          (A3) 
߰ூ௏ = ߚ଴ ௏௔௥(௫̅೒∗ )௏௔௥(௫̅೒) + ߚଵ ௏௔௥(௫̅೒
∗ )
௏௔௥(௫̅೒) .      
Analogously, we can express ߰ை௅ௌ: 
߰ை௅ௌ = ஼௢௩(௫೔,௬೔೒)௏௔௥(௫೔) .         (A4) 
By substituting ݕ௜௚ with Equation (3) and rearranging, we get 
߰ை௅ௌ = ஼௢௩൫௫೔,(ఋାఉబ௫೔∗ା ఉభ௫̅೒∗ ା ௨೔)൯ ௏௔௥(௫೔)          (A5) 
                                                   
43 Note that ܥ݋ݒ൫̅ݔ௚, ݔ௜∗൯ =  ܸܽݎ(̅ݔ௚∗). 
 - 47 -   
߰ை௅ௌ = ߚ଴ ௏௔௥൫௫೔∗൯௏௔௥(௫೔)+ ߚଵ ௏௔௥(௫̅೒
∗ )
௏௔௥(௫೔) .    
The ܴଶ from first stage of the above IV estimation is equal to 
ܴଶ = ௏௔௥൫௫̅೒൯௏௔௥(௫೔) .          (A6) 
Combining all the parts and substituting them into Equation (A1) we get: 
ߨଵ = (ఉబ
ೇೌೝ(ഥೣ೒∗ )ೇೌೝ(ഥೣ೒) ା ఉభ
ೇೌೝ(ഥೣ೒∗ )ೇೌೝ(ഥೣ೒))ି(ఉబ
ೇೌೝ൫ೣ೔∗൯ೇೌೝ൫ೣ೔൯ା ఉభ
ೇೌೝ(ഥೣ೒∗ )ೇೌೝ(ೣ೔) )
ଵିೇೌೝ൫ഥೣ೒൯ೇೌೝ(ೣ೔)
     (A7) 
ߨଵ = ߚଵ߶(௏௔௥൫௫̅೒∗ ൯௏௔௥൫௫̅೒൯ − ௏௔௥൫௫̅೒
∗ ൯
௏௔௥(௫೔) ) + ߚ଴߶(௏௔௥൫௫̅೒
∗ ൯
௏௔௥൫௫̅೒൯ − ௏௔௥൫௫೔
∗൯
௏௔௥(௫೔))      
ߨଵ = ߚଵ߶ܹ + ߚ଴߶ܳ, 
where ߶ = ଵଵିೇೌೝ൫ഥೣ೒൯ೇೌೝ(ೣ೔)
. 
A1.2  Understanding the Direction of the Overall Bias 
Here we show how measurement error affects ߶ܹ and ߶ܳ.  
We start by rewriting ߶W  
߶W= ଵଵିೇೌೝ൫ഥೣ೒൯ೇೌೝ(ೣ೔)
∗ (௏௔௥൫௫̅೒∗ ൯௏௔௥൫௫̅೒൯ − ௏௔௥൫௫̅೒
∗ ൯
௏௔௥(௫೔) )  = 
ೇೌೝቀഥೣ೒∗ ቁ
ೇೌೝ൫ഥೣ೒൯ି
ೇೌೝቀഥೣ೒∗ ቁ
ೇೌೝ൫ೣ೔൯
ଵିೇೌೝ൫ഥೣ೒൯ೇೌೝ(ೣ೔)
.      (A8) 
Because 1= ௏௔௥൫௫̅೒∗ ൯௏௔௥൫௫̅೒൯ + ௏௔௥(ఌത೒)௏௔௥൫௫̅೒൯ and ௏௔௥൫௫̅೒൯௏௔௥(௫೔) = ௏௔௥൫௫̅೒
∗ ൯
௏௔௥(௫೔) + ௏௔௥(ఌത೒)௏௔௥(௫೔), we can further rewrite ߶W as 
follows: 
߶ܹ = ቈ
ೇೌೝቀഥೣ೒∗ ቁ
ೇೌೝ൫ഥೣ೒൯ି
ೇೌೝቀഥೣ೒∗ ቁ
ೇೌೝ൫ೣ೔൯ ቉
ቈೇೌೝቀഥೣ೒∗ ቁೇೌೝ൫ഥೣ೒൯ି
ೇೌೝቀഥೣ೒∗ ቁ
ೇೌೝ൫ೣ೔൯ ቉ା〈
ೇೌೝ(ഄത೒)ೇೌೝ൫ഥೣ೒൯ ି
ೇೌೝ(ഄത೒)ೇೌೝ(ೣ೔)〉
.       (A9) 
Note that the terms in […] are identical. In the absence of measurement error  
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(i.e., if ܸܽݎ(ߝ௜) = 0), the terms in 〈… 〉 are equal to zero so that ߶ܹ is equal to 1. In the presence 
of measurement error the denominator is larger than the numerator because ௏௔௥(ఌത೒)௏௔௥൫௫̅೒൯  > ௏௔௥(ఌത೒)௏௔௥(௫೔), and 
therefore 0 < ߶ܹ < 1. Note that when students are randomly assigned, ߶ܹ is equal to the test 
reliability of ability ௏௔௥൫௫೔∗൯௏௔௥(௫೔).44 
Now let’s have a look at ߶ܳ. If all ability measures have the same variance, we can use the 
formula for the variance of the mean of correlated variables to rewrite ܸܽݎ൫̅ݔ௚∗൯ =  ௏௔௥൫௫೔∗൯ே೒ +
ே೒ିଵ
ே೒ ߩܸܽݎ(ݔ௜∗) and ܸܽݎ൫̅ݔ௚൯ = ௏௔௥൫௫೔
∗൯
ே೒ + ே೒ିଵே೒ ߩܸܽݎ(ݔ௜∗) + ௏௔௥(ఌ೔)ே೒ , where ௚ܰ is the number of 
students in group g, and ߩ is the average correlation of the distinct student abilities in group g.45 
After canceling out ௚ܰ, we can rewrite ௏௔௥൫௫̅೒∗ ൯௏௔௥൫௫̅೒൯ as follows: 
௏௔௥൫௫೔∗൯ା(ே೒ିଵ)ఘ௏௔௥൫௫೔∗൯௏௔௥൫௫೔∗൯ା൫ே೒ିଵ൯ఘ௏ ൫௫೔∗൯ା௏௔ (ఌ೔)  .       (A10) 
We can now rewrite ܳ as follows:  
ܳ = ௏௔௥൫௫೔∗൯ା(ே೒ିଵ)ఘ௏௔௥൫௫೔∗൯௏௔௥൫௫೔∗൯ା൫ே೒ିଵ൯ఘ௏௔௥൫௫೔∗൯ା௏௔௥(ఌ೔) − ௏௔௥൫௫೔
∗൯
௏௔௥൫௫೔∗൯ା௏௔௥(ఌ೔)      (A11) 
ܳ = (ଵା ൫ே೒ିଵ൯ఘ)௏௔௥൫௫೔∗൯(ଵା ൫ே೒ିଵ൯ఘ)௏௔௥൫௫೔∗൯ା௏௔௥(ఌ೔) − ௏௔௥൫௫೔
∗൯
௏௔௥൫௫೔∗൯ା௏௔௥(ఌ೔)         
ܳ = ௏௔௥൫௫೔∗൯௏௔௥൫௫೔∗൯ା ೇೌೝ(ഄ೔)(భశ ൫ಿ೒షభ൯ഐ) −
௏௔௥൫௫೔∗൯௏௔௥൫௫೔∗൯ା௏௔௥(ఌ೔).         
                                                   
44 Note that under random assignment, ܸܽݎ൫̅ݔ௚∗൯ =  ௏௔௥൫௫೔∗൯ே೒  and ܸܽݎ൫̅ݔ௚൯ = ௏௔௥൫௫೔
∗൯
ே೒ + ௏௔௥(ఌ೔)ே೒ . Plugging these in to 
Equation (A8) and rearranging, you can see that ߶W = ௏௔௥൫௫೔∗൯௏௔௥(௫೔). 
45 ρ = ଵܰ݃൫ܰ݃ିଵ൯ ∑
஼௢௩(ݔ∗݅,ݔ∗݆)
௏௔௥(ݔ∗݅)
ܰ݃௜ஷ௝ . 
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Without measurement error, the first and the second term in ܳ are equal, and thus ܳ (and 
߶ܳ) is equal to zero. With measurement error, the magnitude ܳ of depends on average correlation 
of the distinct student abilities ߩ: under random assignment ߩ will be equal to zero, both terms in 
Equation (A11) will be the same and Q will be zero. If students tend to be grouped according to 
their ability, ߩ will be positive; the first term will be larger than the second term in Equation (A11), 
and ܳ (and ߶ܳ) will be positive. Given that students are systematically assigned to groups, the size 
of ܳ increases with ߩ, ௚ܰ and ߚ଴.  
To conclude, in the absence of measurement error, ߶ܹ is equal to one and ߶ܳ is equal to 
zero so that ߨଵ is equal to ߚଵ. With measurement error, the sign of the overall bias depends on 
ߚଵ߶ܹ and ߚ଴߶ܳ. With random assignment (ߩ = 0), ߶ܳ is equal to zero and ߨଵ is only attenuated. 
With systematic assignment (ߩ > 0), ߶ܳ is positive. The overall size of the bias then depends on 
whether the upward bias caused by ߚ଴߶ܳ is larger than the downward bias—assuming that peer 
effects are positive—caused by ߚଵ߶ܹ. 
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A2 Additional Figure 
 Figure A1: Screenshot of the Scheduling Program Used by the SBE Scheduling Department    
 
Note: This screenshot shows the scheduling program Plus Enterprise Timetable©.  
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A3 Randomization Check  We use the following empirical specification for our tests. Take ݕ௜ as a 1xNi vector of the pre-
treatment characteristics of students in course i. The pre-treatment characteristics we consider are 
GPA, age, gender, and student ID rank. ࢀ =  (ݐଵ, … ݐ௡) is a matrix of section dummies. Z is a matrix 
that includes dummies for other course taken at the same time, day and time of the sessions, 
German, Dutch, exchange student status and late registration status. ߝ௜ is a vector of zero-mean 
independent error terms.  
Our randomization tests consist of running, for each course, the following regression:  
ݕ௜ =  ߙ + ࢀࢼ + ࢆࢽ + ߝ௜     (A12) 
Under the null-hypothesis of (conditionally) random assignment to sections within each 
course, β= 0, which means that the section assignment does not systematically relate to students’ 
pre-treatment characteristics, holding constant scheduling and stratification indicators. Therefore, 
we expect the F-test to be significant at the 5 percent level in approximately 5 percent of the cases, 
at the 1 percent level in approximately 1 percent of the cases, and at the 0.1 percent level in 
approximately 0.1 percent of the cases. Table 3 in Section 6 shows that the actual rejection rates 
are close to the rejection rates expected under random assignment. 
 To investigate this issue more closely, we also consider the distribution of p-values. Under 
the null hypothesis of conditionally random assignment, we would expect the p-values of all the 
regressions to closely fit a U[0,1] uniform distribution with a mean of 0.5 (Murdoch et al., 2008). 
Figure A2 shows histograms of the p-values of all four specifications, all of which are roughly 
uniformly distributed. Column (2) of Table A1 shows the mean of the p-values over all regressions 
reported in Table 3. The mean of the p-values ranges from 0.48 to 0.52.  
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Figure A2: Distribution of F-test p-values of β from Equation (A1) as Reported in Table A1 
 
Note: These are histograms with p-values from all the regressions reported in Table 3. The vertical line in each histogram shows the 0.05 significance level.   
 
 
Table A1: Randomization Check: Mean p-values 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable: Total Number of Courses Mean of p-value  
GPA 395 0.493 
Age 392 0.481 
Gender 389 0.508 
ID rank 395 0.523 Note: This table is based on the regressions reported in Table 3. Column (2) shows the means of the p-values.   
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Table A2: Using first year GPA as Measure of Own and Peer Ability 
  (1)  Std. Grade 
    Standardized first year peer GPA 0.0198**  (0.008) Standardized first year GPA 0.6506***  (0.027)   
Observations 12,046 R-squared 0.569 Course FE YES Staff FE YES Other course FE YES Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the course-year-period level are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the standardized course grade. Additional control include dummies for day of the session, time of the session, German, Dutch, exchange student status and late registration status. Other-course fixed effects refer to the course that students are taking at the same time. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table A3: Determinants of Survey Response (OLS) 
  (1) (2) 
 Response Response 
      Standardized peer GPA -0.0015   (0.004)  Highest tertile * fraction of peers in highest tertile  -0.0033   (0.037) Highest tertile * fraction of peers in lowest tertile  -0.0034   (0.034) Middle tertile * fraction of peers in highest tertile  -0.0212   (0.034) Middle tertile * fraction of peers in lowest tertile  0.0292   (0.037) Lowest tertile * fraction of peers in highest tertile  -0.0181   (0.027) Lowest tertile * fraction of peers in lowest tertile  -0.0248   (0.029) Standardized GPA .0722*** .0607***   (.0038) (.0056)    F joined significance of peer variables  0.45 Prob > F =     0.8456    Observations 45,332 45,332 R-squared 0.104 0.104  Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the course-year-period level are in parentheses. Both regressions include fixed effects for the course, fixed effects for the other courses taken at the same time and teacher fixed effects. All specifications include dummies for day of the session, time of the session, German, Dutch, exchange student status and late registration status. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table A4: Separate Regressions for Each Course Evaluation Question 
Nr. Question domain Dependent variable Coefficient of std. peer GPA SE std. peer GPA R-squared 
1 Teacher evaluation Evaluate the overall functioning of your tutor in this course with a grade 0.0034 (0.007) 0.844 
2 Teacher evaluation The tutor sufficiently mastered the course content. -0.0148** (0.007) 0.749 
3 Teacher evaluation The tutor stimulated the transfer of what I learned in this course to other contexts. 0.0046 (0.007) 0.778 
4 Teacher evaluation The tutor encouraged all students to participate in the (tutorial) group discussions. -0.0064 (0.009) 0.695 
5 Teacher evaluation The tutor was enthusiastic in guiding our group. 0.0092 (0.007) 0.795 
6 Teacher evaluation The tutor initiated evaluation of the group functioning. 0.0040 (0.009) 0.655 
7 Group interaction My tutorial group has functioned well. 0.0822*** (0.014) 0.400 
8 Group interaction 
Working in tutorial groups with my fellow-students helped me to better understand the subject matters of this course. 0.0198 (0.012) 0.348 
9 Learning materials The learning materials stimulated me to start and keep on studying. -0.0267** (0.011) 0.287 
10 Learning materials The learning materials stimulated discussion with my fellow students. -0.0166 (0.012) 0.285 
11 Learning materials The learning materials were related to real life situations. -0.0147 (0.012) 0.254 
12 Learning materials 
The textbook, the reader and/or electronic resources helped me studying the subject matters of this course. -0.0197 (0.012) 0.277 
13 Learning materials 
The lectures contributed to a better understanding of the subject matter of this course. -0.0093 (0.010) 0.357 
14 Learning materials In this course ELEUM has helped me in my learning. -0.0287** (0.012) 0.186 
15 General evaluation Please give an overall grade for the quality of this course -0.0143 (0.011) 0.412 
16 General evaluation The course fits well in the educational program. -0.0163 (0.011) 0.297 
17 General evaluation The course objectives made me clear what and how I had to study. -0.0034 (0.013) 0.262 
18 General evaluation The time scheduled for this course was not sufficient to reach the block objectives. 0.0102 (0.013) 0.150 
19 Self-study hours 
How many hours per week on the average (excluding contact hours) did you spend on self-study (presentations, cases, assignments, studying literature, etc.)? 
0.0067 (0.011) 0.279 
    Number of observations in each regression 14,982     Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the course-year-period level are in parentheses. All 19 regressions include fixed effects for the course, fixed effects for the other course taken at the same time and teacher fixed effects. All specifications include dummies for day of the session, time of the session, German, Dutch, exchange student status and late registration status. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 - 56 -   
Table A5: The Effect of Peer Composition on Student Evaluations with Lower and Upper Missing Values Bounds 
Panel A:       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Std. Group interaction Self-study hours Std. Teacher evaluation  lower bound  upper bound lower bound  upper bound lower bound  upper bound 
              Standardized peer GPA 0.0544*** 0.0562*** -0.0804 0.0665 -0.0003 0.0004  (0.015) (0.014) (0.287) (0.101) (0.013) (0.013) Standardized GPA -0.0353*** -0.0340*** -1.8081*** 0.4489*** -0.0449*** -0.0400***  (0.010) (0.010) (0.231) (0.083) (0.009) (0.008)        Observations 15,441 15,441 15,441 15,441 15,441 15,441 R-squared 0.222 0.242 0.122 0.226 0.384 0.411 
       
Panel B:       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
             High GPA * Fraction of high-GPA peers 0.5119*** 0.5247*** -0.4185 -0.7356 0.0873 0.0913  (0.129) (0.131) (0.907) (2.292) (0.094) (0.096) High GPA * Fraction of low-GPA peers -0.1314 -0.1059 -1.4862* 1.3448 -0.0863 -0.0728  (0.116) (0.121) (0.873) (2.198) (0.094) (0.100) Middle GPA * Fraction of high-GPA peers 0.2066 0.2153 -0.7174 3.9182 -0.0445 -0.0593  (0.136) (0.139) (1.076) (2.569) (0.120) (0.125) Middle GPA * Fraction of low-GPA peers 0.0208 0.0215 1.4074 5.3847** 0.0306 0.0104  (0.110) (0.110) (1.079) (2.368) (0.111) (0.114) Low GPA * Fraction of high-GPA peers 0.2688** 0.2681** -0.4423 -0.1719 0.0315 0.0754  (0.116) (0.118) (1.013) (3.282) (0.116) (0.113) Low GPA * Fraction of low-GPA peers 0.0366 0.0461 -1.1360 -4.2525 -0.0825 -0.0775  (0.118) (0.120) (1.056) (2.989) (0.114) (0.115)        Observations 15,441 15,441 15,441 15,441 15,441 15,441 R-squared 0.244 0.224 0.227 0.126 0.411 0.385 Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the course-year-period level are in parentheses. The dependent variables are standardized Group interaction in Columns (1) and (2), self-study hours in Columns (3) and (4), and standardized teacher evaluation in Columns (5) and (6). We assume extreme values for missing answers, which means that for all items we assign the lowest possible value of the used answering scale for our lower bound estimates and the highest possible answer on the answering scale for the upper bound estimates. All specifications include course fixed effects, other-course fixed effects, teacher fixed effects as well dummies for day of the session, time of the session, German, Dutch, exchange student status and late registration status. All regressions reported in Panel B also include Std. GPA. For a list of the exact question wording, see Table 2 in Section 3.2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
 - 57 -   
Table A6: The Effect of Peer Composition on Student Evaluations   (Without Bounding or Imputations) 
Panel A    
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Std. Group functioning Self-study hours Std. Teacher functioning 
        Standardized peer GPA 0.0550*** 0.0433 0.0010  (0.015) (0.092) (0.013) Standardized GPA -0.0358*** 0.0530 -0.0466***  (0.010) (0.088) (0.009)      15,285 15,232 14,654 Observations 0.222 0.267 0.387 
    
Panel B    
  (1) (2) (3) 
        
High GPA * Fraction of high-GPA peers 0.5297*** -0.7109 0.0820 
 (0.131) (0.799) (0.099) High GPA * Fraction of low-GPA peers -0.1180 -0.8725 -0.0830 
 (0.120) (0.766) (0.101) Middle GPA * Fraction of high-GPA peers 0.1881 0.0058 -0.0492 
 (0.141) (0.991) (0.127) Middle GPA * Fraction of low-GPA peers 0.0230 1.7851* 0.0410 
 (0.112) (0.946) (0.118) Low GPA * Fraction of high-GPA peers 0.2727** -0.2952 0.0609 
 (0.119) (0.978) (0.119) Low GPA * Fraction of low-GPA peers 0.0454 -1.4976 -0.0665 
 (0.121) (0.967) (0.120)     
Observations 15,285 15,232 14,654 
F joined significance of peer variables 0.224 0.268 0.388 
Prob > F <.0001 .2169 0.5226 Note: All regressions include fixed effects for the course, fixed effects for the other course taken at the same time and teacher fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the course-year-period level are in parentheses. The dependent variables are standardized Group interaction in Column (1), self-study hours in Column (2) and standardized teacher evaluation in Column (3). All specifications include dummies for day of the session, time of the session, German, Dutch, exchange student status and late registration status. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
